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Market Power in International Carbon Emissions Trading: A Laboratory Test
Björn Carlén†
Abstract
The prospect that governments of one or a few large countries, or trading blocs, would
engage in international greenhouse gas emissions trading has led several policy analysts
to express concerns that trade would be influenced by market power. The experiment
reported here mimics a case where twelve countries, one of which is a large buyer
(the mirror-image of a large seller), trade carbon emissions on an emissions exchange
(a double-auction market) and where traders have quite accurate information about the
underlying net demand. The findings deviate from those of the standard version of market
power effects in that trade volumes and prices converge on competitive levels.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Cost-effectiveness is likely to be an ambition in any international climate treaty aiming at
substantial reductions of greenhouse gas emissions. Indeed, the need for cost-effectiveness was
emphasized in the UNFCCC Article 3 (UN, 1992) and is facilitated by international emissions
trading under Articles 6 and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol (UN, 1997). It is well known that
competitive and well-functioning emissions trading allocates abatement efforts so as to minimize
the total costs of attaining a given aggregate emission target. This outcome might be within
reach, at least for the emissions of carbon dioxide (the single most important greenhouse gas)
from combustion of fossil fuels, since these emissions can be monitored fairly easily by keeping
track of countries’ use of fossil fuels (IPCC, 1996).
The Parties to an international climate treaty would be governments, cf. the Kyoto Protocol.
It is possible, perhaps even likely, that some (large) countries would choose to have their
governments engage in international emissions trading. This prospect has led several analysts to
express concern that market power would have a detrimental effect on the cost-reducing services
of international emissions trading (e.g. IPCC, 1996, Westskog, 1996, Brown et al., 1997, Baron,
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21999, and Burniaux, 1999). One way of preventing this outcome would be to require (large)
countries to delegate the right to trade internationally to domestic firms (ABARE, 1995).
However, prior to limiting governments’ policy options in such a way and thereby possibly
making it more difficult for some countries to commit to an ambitious climate treaty, it is
appropriate to investigate whether market power is likely to arise when governments trade.
So far, the discussion about market power in international emissions trading has been
influenced mainly by standard economic theory, i.e., studies as Hahn (1984) and Westskog
(1996) predicting that a dominant seller (buyer)—or coalition of sellers (buyers)—would
withhold supply (demand) from the market. Such behavior inevitably results in smaller aggregate
cost savings than had the market been competitive. However, some of the assumptions
underlying this prediction may be questioned, in particular the assumption that emissions trading
would be governed by a set of rules (a “trading institution”) according to which all trading would
be conducted simultaneously at a uniform price and traders would be restricted to choosing only
the quantity to supply or demand. Often this assumption is made to facilitate the analytical work
and to allow clear predictions and not because such an institution is a good candidate for
governing real-world emissions trading. International emissions trading would likely take
place—at least, eventually—on an exchange and be governed by so-called double auction (DA)
rules (Sandor, Cole and Kelly, 1994). Under DA rules, trade is sequential and traders can state
bids and asks or accept (part of) other traders’ bids and asks.1 Hence, different transactions can
be concluded at different prices. In this circumstance, the outcome of standard monopoly
analysis is no longer the most profitable one for the dominant trader. Versions of the DA
institution govern trade on exchanges such as the New York stock exchange and the major
Chicago commodity exchanges (Friedman, 1993).2
Experimental methods have long been used to investigate the properties of the DA institution.
The results of stylized laboratory experiments suggest that standard economic theory regarding
market power may not be relevant for DA markets; trade tends to be efficient even when the
market is monopolized. (See Smith (1981), Smith and Williams (1989), Ledyard and Szakaly-
More (1994) and Muller, Mestelman, Spraggon and Godby (2001) for monopoly/monopsony
experiments, and Plott (1989), Davis and Holt (1993) and Holt (1995) for reviews of the
experimental literature on DA markets.) In these experiments, prices of initial transactions often
deviate substantially from the efficient price level but they tend to converge to that level over
time in, a potential reason for this being that initially traders only had private information about
their own valuations/costs.3
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 On a single (English) auction a set of buyers (sellers) bid for (offer) an object and the buyer (seller) with the
highest (lowest) bid (offer) makes the transaction. On a double auction both these phenomena occurs
simultaneously and a transaction is struck if the highest bid and the lowest offer coincide.
2
 Despite the importance and long history of DA-based markets no general theory regarding behavior under DA
rules has yet emerged. Some contributions to such a theory have been made, though (e.g., Friedman, 1991,
Easley and Ledyard, 1993, and Gjerdstad and Dickhaut, 1995).
3
 Godby (1999) presents an experiment in which the presence of a monopolist (monopsonist) seems to have resulted
in closing prices higher (lower) than the efficient level, although this did not substantially reduce efficiency
attained, as compared to the case where permits were allotted in a way creating a competitive market
environment. He offers two potential reasons for the observed outcome: (1) in contrast to the DA experiments
referred to above the dominant trader here had full information about the small firms’ costs while small firms
3As explained in Section 2 below, traders that engage in intergovernmental carbon emissions
trading are likely to have approximately common information about participating countries’
marginal abatement costs (MACs) and, hence, about expected aggregate net demand for
emission quota units. Experimental work regarding intergovernmental emissions trading is so far
quite limited and the question of market power does not seem to have been explicitly addressed.
The focus has been on either bilateral bargaining or trade on DA markets with several (large)
traders on both sides of the market; see Bohm (1997), Bohm and Carlén (1999), Hizen and Saijo
(forthcoming) and Søberg (2000). Although these studies employ different market configurations
as well as different information structures, they all report outcomes of high efficiency. For a
review of this literature, see Bohm (forthcoming).
The objective of the experiment reported in this paper is to test whether a large trader, facing
an opposite side of the market that is fairly competitive, is able to exert market power under
conditions likely to hold in intergovernmental carbon emissions trading on a DA market.
The approach taken here was to design a laboratory experiment that parallels the field to a
greater extent than what has been common in Experimental Economics. The presumption is that,
as compared to stylized experiments, such an experiment is more likely to produce relevant
information regarding whether or not the phenomenon under investigation is likely to occur in
the field, cf. Smith (1982).
The commitment/trading period in an international climate treaty is likely to span several
years, such as the five years stipulated in the Kyoto Protocol. Uncertainty about MACs and the
efficient price level could be considerable at the outset, but is likely to fall over time. The design
of the experiment reported here corresponds to trade towards the end of the emissions trading
period, when uncertainty and information asymmetries are likely to be small or even negligible.
This final trading determines whether or not trading during the commitment period as a whole is
efficient. Thus, focusing on the final trades allows a test of whether the presence of a dominant
trader is likely to reduce market efficiency.
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the trading situation likely to be faced
by countries engaging in intergovernmental carbon emission quota trade and considers its
implications for large countries’ ability to exert market power. Section 3 describes the
experimental design. Section 4 presents the competitive and the market power outcomes.
The results of the experiment are presented in Section 5. Concluding remarks are offered in a
final section.
2. THE TRADING SITUATION
The analysis presented below takes as given a Kyoto-like climate treaty in which each of a set
of industrialized countries is allotted an emission quota for the sum of its carbon emissions over
a five-year long commitment period and the signatories—the governments—are allowed to trade
                                                                                                                                                              
knew only their own costs; (2) several small firms were excluded from the market for a wide range of prices, or
ran the risk of being so, something that may have reduced small firms’ willingness to engage in the type of
countervailing speculation discussed in Smith (1981). Although these circumstances may reflect conditions in
real domestic emission permit trade amongst firms, they are not likely to be met in intergovernmental emissions
trading.
4quota units with each other.4 Systems for monitoring of emissions and enforcement of
compliance behavior are assumed to be viable. All quota-unit trade is governed by DA rules.
Figure 1 illustrates the underlying net demand of a country with a strictly binding emission
quota (Q) and a MAC function that increases in emission abatements. The MAC function reflects
the consumption value made available by efficient use of an additional carbon emission unit. By
accepting the tradable quota (TQ), the country commits itself to an emission reduction equal to
the difference between its business-as-usual (BAU) emission level Q0 and Q. If the country
accomplishes this emission reduction solely by the means of domestic abatements, its MAC
would equal MAC(Q) and its cost of compliance would equal the area QQ0MAC(Q). By
engaging in emissions trade the country can reduce its compliance cost (make trade gains) either
by replacing domestic “high cost” abatements with “low cost” abatements via purchase of quota
units from other countries or by selling quota units at prices higher than MAC(Q). Thus, for
prices below (above) MAC(Q) the country has a positive (negative) underlying net demand for
quota units.5 Hence, countries with strictly binding emission quotas will be net sellers for
sufficiently high prices and net buyers for sufficiently low prices.
Figure 1. Illustration of a country’s expected underlying net demand of carbon quota units.
Given the high values at stake in intergovernmental carbon emissions trading, countries would
have strong incentives to try to conceal information about their own MACs as well as gather
information about expected MAC functions of other countries prior to trading. However, each
country’s MAC function is estimated by means of market data and assessments of the
performance of well-known technologies. Such information is obtainable at low costs also for
observers outside an open economy, which makes it difficult for individual countries to conceal
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 The kind of climate treaty discussed here might allow countries to bank and possibly also borrow (up to some
limit) emission quota units to/from the next five-year budget period. Moreover, countries may have the
opportunity to trade on futures markets, i.e., trade quota units valid for the next budget period. These aspects of
emission quota trade are not taken into account here.
5
 The concept of net demand is defined in relation to the country’s “target level”, i.e., its initial quota Q plus net
purchases of emission quota units. Figure 1 illustrates the underlying net demand of a country at the beginning of
the trading period when the target level equals Q.
5large parts of their abatement opportunities and associated costs other than for perhaps some
limited time, should they want to do so.6 Therefore, to a first approximation, participating
countries would have roughly common information about each other’s (and the aggregate)
expected underlying net demand relationships for the commitment period as a whole. This implies
that countries would have more or less common expectations about the efficient price level (p*).
As new information becomes available, countries would be able to update their expectations, so
that towards the end (when, say, 4-6 months remains) of the five year long commitment period
they would be likely to have even better information about everyone else’s MAC functions. By
then, all countries would thus be able to estimate p* with a high degree of accuracy.
Countries that observe price levels deviating substantially from their current expectations
would be likely to update their expectations regarding future price levels or, as long as their
trading budget so allows, engage in speculative trade, or some combination thereof. This implies
that even countries expected to act as large net sellers may for some time appear as buyers on the
market and vice versa.
The trading situation outlined above has several implications for the ability of dominant
countries to exert market power, three of which are highlighted here.
(1) On an emission quota market, in contrast to many other markets, countries may shift
trading positions when prices change. Thus, even if a buyer country dominates the market at
prices around p, there exist prices significantly below p which the dominant country would like
to see materialize, other things equal, but which would turn “former” sellers into buyers, hence
creating competition for the original buyer (mutatis mutandis for an original seller). Therefore, a
tradable quota market for carbon emissions would not allow a country to remain in an equally
dominant position when prices become increasingly favorable to it.
(2) Trade under DA rules is sequential and prices of different transactions may vary. Thus,
a dominant trader can exert market power either by price discrimination or by withholding
demand/supply from the market in order to influence prices, or some combination thereof. If a
dominant buyer (seller) succeeds in carrying out inter-temporal price discrimination, transactions
would be concluded at ascending (descending) prices over time. The fact that additional
transactions do not affect the prices of already concluded transactions implies that, for every
transaction, the dominant country’s marginal expenditures (revenues) of an additional transaction
equal the price of that transaction. This means that the dominant country has incentives to
continue to trade until prices equal its MACs.7 Similarly, a dominant buyer (seller)
that—according to standard theory of market power—holds back demand (supply) to
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 MAC functions of individual countries (or regions) are being assessed already today by research institutes and
international organizations, e.g., CICERO, MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change and
UNEP. If intergovernmental emissions trading should materialize, efforts directed to such activities could be
expected to increase substantially and, hence, so also the accurateness of the assessments.
7
 The discussion here presumes that quota-unit prices at the end of a commitment period do not influence prices in
the succeeding commitment period to any significant extent. If they did, the dominant trader’s value of
additional emission quota holding in the current period would not equal its MACs for that period, and the
dominant buyer (seller) would find further trade profitable only as long as the price is lower (higher) than its
marginal valuation. However, in emissions trading of the type discussed here, prices in a five-year long trading
period would likely be a function of expectations regarding end-prices in that period (discounted by the interest
rate), rather than a function of end-prices in the preceding period. Thus, the assumption made seems justified.
6competitive sellers (buyers), in an attempt to reduce (increase) prices, will find further trade
profitable if the price falls below (exceeds) its MAC. Thus, regardless of whether the dominant
trader exerts market power through price discrimination or by withholding quantities from the
market the price level could be expected to approach p*. Thus, even a dominant trader that is
able to influence prices on a DA market is unlikely to cause the net trade volume—and all
transaction prices—to deviate from the efficient level, see Plott (1989) and Holt (1995) for a
discussion about experimental results.
(3) Given that experienced traders would be aware of the outcome in (2) above, and given that
these traders would be equipped with more or less common and quite accurate information (and
thus more or less common expectations) not even the early prices (during the end period trading
in focus here) would be likely to deviate substantially from p*. And even if they were to do so,
speculation would likely drive the price back to p*.
To sum up, in contrast to standard economic theory, the trading situation outlined for the end
of the emission budget period leads to the hypotheses (i) that the presence of a dominant country
will not prevent the market from being efficient, i.e., reaching the cost-effective allocation of
abatements, and (ii) that a dominant country will not be able to exert market power in the sense
of establishing early prices that deviate substantially from p*. Thus, it is hypothesized that the
outcome of this kind of end period trade will be close to the perfectly competitive outcome even
when a single trader dominates the market.8
The objective here is to test these propositions in an experimental setting.
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
3.1 Design Issues
The design of the experiment presented here differs in three major aspects from those
commonly used in laboratory market experiments. First, the common approach of repetitive
trade under stationary conditions, whereby subjects gain experience and the market conveys
information to traders and thereby generate common expectations, is abandoned here. The
reason is that this approach does not parallel the field. In case of real intergovernmental carbon
emissions trading, governments would be likely to hire experienced traders to represent them,
i.e., individuals who have acquired their competence from trading in other commodities.
Moreover, as argued earlier, these traders would likely form their expectations regarding the
efficient price level at the end of a five-year long trading period on the basis of estimates of the
countries’ MACs functions, rather than on prices realized at the end of the preceding emission
trading period. Therefore, prior to the experiment, subjects were given extensive written
information consistent with such information gathering under the trading situation outlined in
Section 2.
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 Given a prediction based on this hypothesis, one may wonder why a large country, expected to dominate one side
of the market, would accept a rule requiring all quota-unit trade to be conducted on a DA market. It should be
kept in mind that the hypothesis stated here only regards trade during the end of a possible five-year long
commitment period when expectations are common and accurate. Prior to that time, prices may well deviate
(perhaps substantially) from what will turn out to be p* and doing so in ways favorable to the dominant trader, as
suggested by Muller et al.
7Second, the standard procedure of creating “context-free” laboratory markets is abandoned
here. This procedure aims at avoiding any information about the context that would influence the
behavior of subjects in ways that add noise to or bias to the outcome. However, as discussed in
Lowenstein (1999), Bohm (forthcoming) and Hertwig and Ortmann (2001) and the responses to
that article, the absence of an explicit context may also affect subjects’ behavior. For instance,
subjects may have difficulties grasping and solving abstract decision problems. Moreover,
subjects may create their own contexts that trigger certain “modes of mind” which may or may
not be relevant for the research question at issue. Thus, also the absence of an explicit context
may affect behavior in ways that add noise to and even bias the outcome. Indeed, results from
experiments regarding ultimatum and dictator games show that subjects’ behavior to a large
extent may depend (in ways resistant to changes in incentive levels) on the context used to
present the decision task, see e.g., Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat and Smith (1994). Currently, we
do not know to what extent this phenomenon transfers to the case of DA markets.9 Therefore,
subjects were here given instructions with the explicit context that drives the research question.
To be sure, such instructions are lengthier and may take longer time for (some) subjects to digest
than the context-free type commonly used to create laboratory markets. However, as explained
below, subjects were here given ample time to study the instructions and work out strategies and,
in addition, were trained in both context-free and context-filled lab markets.
Third, subjects were here given pecuniary incentives stronger than those regularly induced in
lab markets. Thus, each subject faced higher costs of letting considerations other than profit
maximization influence his/her behavior.
Information as to which countries would become pioneers in international emissions trading is
not (yet) at hand, and even if it were, it would not be possible to forecast with any higher degree
of accuracy the market structure that would emerge at the end of a five-year long trading period.
Given the objective of testing for market power effects, the approach taken here was to assume a
carbon emission quota market comprised of twelve industrialized countries—the US, Japan and
ten EU countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden and UK)—with one country, the US, standing out as a dominant buyer. Focus is here on
buyer market power since it has been observed in DA experiments that subjects tend to perform
better when acting as buyers than when acting as sellers (Smith and Williams, 1982). Otherwise,
one would run the risk of not detecting market power because subjects who would play the role
of the dominant trader have less experience as a seller than as a buyer.
After the conclusion of this experiment conditions important for emission trading under the
Kyoto Protocol underwent changes. In particular, the US has announced that it will not ratify the
Protocol. Thus, in the case where Russia ratifies and the Protocol enters into force, Russia would
likely dominate the market as a seller. However, given the objective of testing market power at the
end of a five-year long trading period these circumstances are of limited interest. Since the market
structure during the end-period trade in focus here might deviate substantially from the one
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 To the best of the author’s knowledge, there exist no systematic studies of this phenomenon on DA markets. The
current view seems to be that instructions do not have important impacts on the outcome in DA experiments
(Hoffman, McCabe and Smith, 2000). However, this conjecture is based on the results of DA-experiments
providing only little, if any, variation in this dimension of subject instructions.
8indicated by the sum of trade flows over the whole commitment period, the emergence of a
dominant buyer at the end of that period cannot be ruled out. Moreover, a seller country in an
equally dominant position would face similar incentives to exert market power as the buyer country
in study here. Therefore, the outcome may be equally valid for the case of a dominant seller.
Furthermore, it is assumed that when 4-6 months of the commitment period remain, these
countries’ have a substantial “need” for additional net trade. More precisely, we assume that at
this point in time each one of these countries would be on the order of 20% from full compliance
of a Kyoto Protocol-like environment. These assumptions and estimates of these countries’
MACs for the year 2010 (available in December 1997 when the design of this experiment was
determined) yield a market structure at a hypothetical perfectly competitive equilibrium with
nine expected net sellers and three expected net buyers.10 The main buyer (the US) alone
accounts for approximately 90% of the efficient net trade of approximately 400 (units) Mton
carbon dioxide (CO2).
Subjects were recruited among advanced undergraduate students in Economics or Finance,
with one exception. In order to test for market power effects, it was crucial that subjects who
represented the dominant country would be confident in this role. These subjects were therefore
selected amongst Ph.D. students in Economics who had proved their negotiation skills in earlier
laboratory experiments, i.e., Bohm and Carlén (1999).
The market institution used was the computerized multi-unit double-auction (MUDA) market
developed by Plott (1991). This institution was chosen because it allows subjects to trade without
being assigned predetermined buyer or seller roles.
3.2 Experimental Procedures
Two days before the experiment, subjects received instructions11 including:
• an introduction to the climate change policy issue,
• information about all countries’ expected MAC functions and the competitive outcome
calculated on basis of this information,
• the trading rules,
• the show-up fee and
• a statement that they could earn considerable amounts of money by trading emission quota
units on the behalf of the (unidentified) country they would represent.12
The full instructions are reproduced in Appendix.
Subjects were also informed about the fact that countries’ expectations regarding their MAC
functions could be updated and that they would receive, as private information at the beginning
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 Estimates of countries’ MAC functions were collected from Capros, Georakopoulos, Katsoumili and
Filippoupolitis (1997), EU (1996) and IPCC (1996).
11
 At this time subjects were not informed about which country they would represent. Given this procedure and the
fact that during the experiment subjects would be anonymous and not allowed to communicate, the risk of
collusion among subjects was deemed insignificant.
12
 During the experiment the countries were labeled country #0, #1, ... #11.
9of the experiment, the relevant MAC function for the country they were asked to represent. It
was stressed that only small information asymmetries were to be expected. Furthermore, to
mimic the situation of experienced and well informed traders as outlined in Section 2, subjects
were given information about the expected outcome on a DA market, i.e., that final prices tend to
end up near the efficient price level and that traders might engage in speculative trade if prices
deviated substantially from their expectations.13
Prior to the experiment subjects participated in an extensive two-hour training program. The
training program consisted of (i) an introduction to the computerized DA mechanism and the
educational software included in MUDA, (ii) repetition of essential parts of the written
instructions, and (iii) two training rounds in order to familiarize subjects with trading on a
MUDA-based market and with interpreting the kind of underlying net-demand functions that
would be used in the experiment. The parameter set-up in these training rounds differed
substantially from those used in the experiment.14
Once a subject had been assigned the role of a particular country, he/she received as private
information an updated version of that country’s MAC function (i.e., the country’s underlying
net demand function) and the size of that country’s initial trading budget. No information was
given whether other countries’ MAC functions had been updated. (The distance—in terms of
prices—between the expected and updated MAC curve of a country was never larger than 4% of
the expected curve, a fact that was not disclosed to the subjects.) Each subject was given an
initial trading budget. Thus, all subjects, including those representing expected net sellers, could
engage in speculative trade from start.15
Incentives: In order to mimic a situation in which traders representing countries on a real
market for carbon emissions would have incentives to try to maximize their respective countries’
trade gains, subjects were paid a fraction of the trade gains they achieved for their countries.
Since the underlying demand and supply conditions implied a highly unequal trade-gain
distribution for a wide range of outcomes, including the case where traders behaved as if trading
under perfect competition (see Tables I and II), differentiated personal payoff factors were used
so as to produce a more even distribution of incentive payments.16 The expected incentive
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 As pointed out by a referee, also giving subjects representing the dominant trader information about the level of
the expected monospony price might allow an even stronger test of market power effects. This was not done here
for two reasons. First, given information about expected aggregate and individual net-demand relationships for
carbon emissions and, hence, about the expected competitive price level, such additional information was not
deemed necessary for subjects to be able to successfully work out market power strategies—something they had
both capacity and time to do. Second, such information might draw subjects’ attention away from the possibility
of price discrimination.
14
 The first round amounted to a one-period replication of the stylized laboratory experiment presented in Holt,
Langan and Villamil (1986) with pecuniary incentives. The second round introduced the type of continuous
marginal-costs functions relevant for intergovernmental emissions trading, using oil trading as an example.
15
 Although a country’s initial trading budget can be expected to vary positively with the size of the country and its
expected net demand for quota units, there is no simple rule that can be applied. Here, each country’s trading
budget was set so as to correspond to the higher of the following two values, (1) its expected quota import
expenditures in the competitive outcome plus 30% of that amount, and (2) two percent of its GDP.
16
 The subject representing country #0 received SEK 6 per SEK million of trade gains achieved for that country. The
payoff factors for countries #1-#11 were SEK 3, 4, 2, 15, 7, 8, 8, 15, 1.5, 1 and 10, respectively. The likelihood
that subjects would “play” against the experimenter by allocating trade surplus to the subject(s) with the highest
10
payment per subject and period, calculated on the basis that the outcome would be close to the
competitive outcome, ranged from SEK 70 to SEK 130, in addition to a fixed payment of SEK
25 per period (over and above the show-up fee of SEK 200). (During the period the experiment
was carried out, winter 1998 to spring 1999, SEK 1 ≈ USD 0.12.) Any net losses at the end of
the period would be deducted from the fixed payment, up to a maximum deduction of SEK 25.
Hence, although subjects could not lose money by participating in the experiment, they could
“lose” money by engaging in trade. Moreover, they could gain considerable amounts of money,
even in the event they initially made losses not exceeding the fixed payment by too much.17
Subjects’ experimental earnings turned out to range from SEK 3 to SEK 2,075 (net of the
show-up fee and income taxes).
Each subject participated in one session that consisted of two 35-minute trading periods.
The environment of the second period deviated only slightly from the one used in the first
period. In order to reduce potential effects of multi-period game strategies, the subjects did not
receive any information about the relevant situation for the second period until after the
completion of the first period. Each subject played the role of the same country in each period.
4. BENCHMARK CASES
Given the hypotheses stated in Section 2, a natural benchmark is the competitive outcome.
The rate of market efficiency is here defined as the achieved share of the maximum cost
reduction (trade gains) from emission quota trading. The maximum cost reduction equals the
difference in aggregate costs between the case in which all countries fulfill their commitments
unilaterally and the case of efficient emissions trading, i.e., the case where the countries’ MACs
have been equalized. The competitive outcome for the environments used in period 1 and period
2, respectively are shown Tables I and II. Both tables show
• the amount by which each country would need to reduce its emissions under unilateral
emission reduction (column 2),
• the costs of these reductions (column 3),
• the emission reductions in the efficient-trade case (column 4),
• the cost of these reductions (column 5) and
• the resulting trade gains (column 6).
A country’s efficient net export of emission quota units is given by the difference between
columns 4 and 2. The trade gains of an exporting country are calculated as export revenues
minus the additional abatement costs due to export activities. For an importing country, trade
                                                                                                                                                              
payoff factor(s) was deemed low since (a) subjects knew only their own payoff factor, (b) each subject was
anonymous to others when trading (only the country code was revealed to others) and (c) the subjects were not
allowed to communicate in other ways than sending bids via the MUDA program.
17
 Despite the possibility of losing up to 25 SEK plus (in the period) already achieved trade gains, it is possible,
perhaps even likely, that this limitation of the risk for the subjects lead to excessive risk taking. However, with a
requirement that subjects are not allowed to lose money by participating in the experiment and a limited
experimental budget this is unavoidable.
11
gains equal the abatement cost savings minus the expenditure on imported quota units. Efficient
net trade in periods 1 and 2 reallocates 396 Mton carbon dioxide (CO2) and 387 Mton CO2,
respectively, or approximately 14% of the aggregate emission reduction in each period. This
trade would cut the cost of reaching the aggregate CO2 emission reduction of 2,768 and 2,780
Mton by 18% and 17%, respectively, for the two periods. The competitive outcome gives 34%
and 45% of the surplus to the buyers, respectively, for the two periods.18
Another benchmark of interest is the case where the major buyer (the US) acts in accordance
with standard economic theory regarding market power in emissions trading (Hahn, 1984) and
withholds demand while the other countries behave as price takers. In this case it is assumed that
all trade is conducted simultaneously at a uniform price. Then, the US maximizes its gains by
withholding demand in the amount of 117 Mton and 100 Mton, or by 33% and 29% of its
"competitive" demand in periods 1 and 2, respectively. The resulting price equals SEK 1,178 per
ton CO2 and SEK 1,065 per ton CO2, or 81% and 89% of the efficient price level in periods 1 and
2, respectively. In this case, the US’s profits amount to SEK 152 billions and SEK 146 billions
(144% and 119% of its competitive outcome) in periods 1 and 2, respectively. Aggregate trade
gains of the other countries amount to SEK 133 billions and SEK 112 billions (56% and 66% of
their competitive outcome) in periods 1 and 2, respectively. The efficiency of this monospony
case is as low as 83% (period 1) and 89% (period 2).
Table I. Competitive outcome in period 1, Mton CO2 and SEK billion, respectively
p* = MSEK 1,450/Mton
Unilateral                      Emission reduction ex post trade:
Emission Cost Mton Cost Net gain
reduction
Belgium (#0) 12 2.20 34 20.9 13.2
Germany (#1) 220 66.0 285 128 32.6
Greece (#2) 0 0 21 10.3 20.1
Spain (#3) 0 0 60 35.2 55.8
France (#4) 25 12.7 35 25.0 2.30
Italy (#5) 80 32.0 110 65.8 9.80
Netherlands (#6) 30 11.2 46 27.4 7.10
Portugal  (#7) 6 0.90 18 9.9 8.40
Sweden (#8) 15 18.0 9 6.5 2.80
UK (#9) 80 19.3 240 174 77.3
US (#10) 1,900 1,477 1,550 871 106
Japan (#11) 400 271 360 206 7.30
Total 2,768 1,910 2,768 1,568 342
                                                 
18
 In DA experiments it has been observed that there is a tendency that prices converge towards p* from
below/above if aggregate producer surplus (evaluated at the competitive outcome) exceeds/falls short of
aggregated consumer surplus, the so-called convergence bias (Smith and Williams, 1982). This phenomenon has
been observed in experiments where trade units have been distributed evenly among the subjects and, hence, its
effects cannot be attributed to market power. Thus, a convergence bias could here be expected to generate price
paths converging to p* from below. However, given the induced information structure, it is hypothesized that the
price path would be largely independent of the relation of buyers’ and sellers’ surpluses at price p*. The opposite
would imply that traders consciously give away (arbitrage) gains.
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Table II. Competitive outcome in period 2, Mton CO2 and SEK billion, respectively
p* = MSEK 1,200/Mton
Unilateral                            Emission reduction ex post trade:
Emission Cost Mton Cost Net gain
reduction
Belgium 10 1.6 0 33 18.4 10.7
Germany 210 63.0 275 120 21.5
Greece 0 0 20 9.80 14.2
Spain 0 0 53 29.0 34.6
France 25 9.84 36 20.7 2.34
Italy 70 28.0 105 63.0 7.00
Netherlands 25 8.90 40 23.0 3.93
Portugal 10 2.10 20 9.80 4.28
Sweden 15 17.2 8 4.80 4.05
UK 85 18.1 240 144 60.1
US 1,950 1,352 1,600 810 122
Japan 380 223 350 182 5.25
Total 2,780 1,724 2,780 1,434 290
5. RESULTS
The experiment consists of five sessions. This relatively small number is due to budget
reasons of two kinds. First, the available number of “uncontaminated” subjects was limited,
allowing only one or two sessions per semester. Second, the chosen approach of testing
emissions trading is rather expensive; the average cost per experimental session amounted to
approximately USD 1,000. As mentioned above, each session consisted of two periods.
However, period 2 of session 1 and period 1 of session 2 encountered problems not likely to arise
in the case of real emissions trading.19 Therefore, trading periods 1.2 and 2.1 have been omitted
from the analysis. So, the experiment produced four independent period-1 observations and four
independent period-2 observations.20
The outcome of the experiment is summarized in Table III below. Notable is the fact that in
none of the four period-1 observations or the four period-2 observations did the US withhold
demand to the extent predicted by standard economic theory. In fact, in all periods the quantities
                                                 
19
 During period 2, session 1, network problems caused the MUDA program to duplicate automatically each
transaction. Therefore, the ex post trade quota allocation differed substantially from the efficient one. Still, prices
were close to p*; on average 98% of p*. In period 1, session 2, the subject representing Germany misunderstood
the cost-schedule in a way that made him sell around two-third of Germany’s initial quota. Therefore, prices
were substantially below p* (on average 53% of p*) and those subjects who speculated in that prices eventually
would approach p* made losses.
20
 This low number of independent observations, which obviously limits the power of any statistical test, is not
unusual in lab market experiments, although it perhaps should be. For instance, Ledyard and Szakaly-More
(1994) and Godby (1999) each produced three independent observations of monopolized markets. Godby also
produced three independent observations of monopsonized markets. Muller et al. (2001) yielded two
independent observations of each one of four different series of monopolized, competitive and monopsonized
markets, which, under the assumption of insignificant “learning effects” were treated as giving six observation
each of monopolized and monopsonized markets, respectively.
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imported by the US are closer to the efficient level than to the market power prediction. The
hypothesis that US’s net imports would equal the market power benchmark is rejected for the
period-1 outcome as well as for the period-2 outcome by the t-test at less than the 1-% level in
favor of the alternative of higher imports. The principal result of the experiment is therefore that
of high efficiency. In six of the eight trading periods more than 95% of the potential (maximum)
trade gains were realized.21 The hypothesis that the efficiency outcome equals the market power
benchmark is rejected in favor of the alternative of higher efficiency by the t-test only at the 10-
% level for the period-1 outcome but at less than the 1-% level for the period-2 outcome. Given
this result of high efficiency, it is not surprising that closing prices are near the efficient levels;
the hypothesis that the closing price equals the market power benchmark is rejected at the 1-%
level in favor of the alternative of a higher price (closer to p*) for both the period-1 outcome and
the period-2 outcome. However, we cannot reject that mean prices equal the monopsony price.
Table III. Outcomes in percent of competitive levels
Monopsony                              Trading period                                    Average    
1 2 1.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 4.1 4.2 5.1 5.2 1 2 All
Efficiency 83 89 87 98 99 99 78 96 99 100 91 98 95
Closing price* 81 89 90 100 100 98 86 91 98 100 94 97 96
Initial price* 81 89 83 63 76 90 65 92 30 75 64 80 72
Average price 81 89 88 77 89 101 68 100 83 98 82 94 88
US quantity
    demanded 67 71 88 99 96 91 115 98 98 96 100 96 98
Profits
US 144 119 158 150 143 104 270 150 189 101 190 126 158
Others 56 66 56 61 79 96 -8 56 59 99 46 78 62
* The average of the five first/lasts transactions.
Despite these similarities, the period-1 outcome and the period-2 outcome differ substantially
with respect to how prices evolved. In three of the four period-1 observations prices converged to
p* from below, see Figures 2–9. The exception is period 1.1 where the outcome was a flat price
path somewhat below p*. In three of the four period-2 observations the outcome was a relatively
flat price path quite close to p*. The exception is period 2.2, in which prices set out from a low
level and converged to p* just before the market closed.22 Given this difference in price paths23 it
is not surprising that the trade gain distribution is closer to the competitive case in the period-2
                                                 
21
 The relatively low efficiency in periods 1.1 and 4.1 is to a large extent due to the behavior of subjects other than
those representing the US. For instance, in period 1.1, the subject representing Sweden would have benefited
from buying, but chose to sell emission quota units. Similarly, in period 4.1, the subject representing Japan sold
large quantities of quota units. Due to the high MACs of Japan and Sweden, “low-cost” abatements were
replaced with “high-cost” ones, which reduced market efficiency.
22
 Given the mistake made in period 2.1 by the subject representing Germany (see footnote 19), it can be questioned
whether the outcome in period 2.2 should be interpreted as the result of emissions trading among experienced
traders having common and accurate expectations regarding p*.
23
 The hypothesis of the relative deviation of initial prices from p* being equal in period 1 and period 2 is rejected by
the so-called Permutaion tests in favour of the alternative of higher prices in period 2 at the 12.5-% level, the
lowest possible level given the small number of observations available here. The same goes for average prices.
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outcome than in period-1. Tables IV and V that show the outcomes in period 1 and period 2 in
session 5, respectively, illustrate this result. Since essentially all potential cost savings were
realized in these periods (99% and 100%, respectively) the difference in trade gains is mainly
due to the differences in price paths, see Figures 8 and 9.
Figure 2. Period 1, Session 1
Figure 3. Period 2, Session 2
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Figure 4. Period 1, Session 3
Figure 5. Period 2, Session 3
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Figure 6. Period 1, Session 4
Figure 7. Period 2, Session 4
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Figure 8. Period 1, Session 5
Figure 9. Period 2, Session 5
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Table IV. Outcome in period 1, session 5, Mton CO2 and SEK billion, respectively
p* = MSEK 1,450/Mton
Unilateral                 Emission reduction ex post trade:
Emission Cost Mton Cost Net gain
reduction
Belgium 12 2.20 31 16.9 13.0
Germany 220 66.0 286 129 111
Greece 0 0 21 10.3 8.84
Spain 0 0 60 31.2 20.2
France 25 12.7 25 12.7 1.02
Italy 80 32.0 108 62.9 4.86
Netherlands 30 11.2 48 30.7 5.37
Portugal 6 0.90 18 9.88 0.50
Sweden 15 18.0 9 6.52 7.86
UK 80 19.3 244 180 -55.7
US 1,900 1,477 1,556 872 200
Japan 400 271 362 208 21.7
Total 2,768 1,910 2,768 1,571 339
Table V. Outcome period 2 in session 5, Mton CO2 and SEK billion, respectively
p* = MSEK 1,200/Mton
Unilateral                 Emission reduction ex post trade:
Emission Cost Mton Cost Net gain
reduction
Belgium 10 1.56 33 18.4 10.1
Germany 210 63.0 274 118 32.2
Greece 0 0 20 9.80 11.8
Spain 0 0 53 29.0 27.8
France 25 9.84 36 20.7 2.30
Italy 70 28.0 104 61.8 5.07
Netherlands 25 8.93 40 23.0 2.99
Portugal 10 2.08 20 9.80 2.86
Sweden 15 17.2 8 4.80 5.50
UK 85 18.1 240 144 58.2
US 1,950 1,352 1,615 828 123
Japan 380 223 337 167 7.60
Total 2,780 1,724 2,780 1,435 290
The period-1 outcomes seem to suggest that the dominant buyer was successful in conducting
inter-temporal price discrimination. However, the fact that the prices paths in the period 2 results
lie closer to the efficient level (with the exception of period 2.2.) indicates that even if the subject
representing the dominant buyer was able to substantially manipulate the market to their
advantage in the first period, they were not able to do so to the same extent in the second period.
Still, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the mean price equals the monopsony price and the
subjects representing the US were able to gain more than the competitive profit level. Further
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tests are needed to discriminate between potential reasons for this occurrence, which (besides
market manipulation) include (i) that large traders have an advantage over small traders in
speculative trade, (ii) the fact that the subjects playing the role of US were more sophisticated
than those representing the other countries, and (iii) the fact that subjects have more experience
as buyers than as sellers, as suggested by Smith and Williams (1982).
Given the extensive efforts made to train and inform the subjects in ways compatible with the
field, but different from the approach commonly used in Experimental Economics, the stark
difference between the period-1 outcome and the period-2 outcome is somewhat puzzling. The
former resembles the outcomes observed in DA experiments where subjects only had private
information regarding their MACs and, hence, no or only limited information about the efficient
price level (see e.g., the outcome in the early periods of Smith and Williams, 1989, and the
outcome in Muller et al.). It may be the case that, in spite of the efforts made to train and inform
them, the subjects needed an opportunity to trade at least once under conditions similar to those
used in the test in order to acquire the competence of experienced traders and/or to learn to trust
the information given to them. If so, only the period-2 outcome would reflect the case where
experienced traders have accurate expectations.
If subjects in period 1 for some reason distrusted/disregarded the information about expected
MACs and the competitive price,24 another possible explanation would arise for the price paths
observed in that period, namely that the they have been driven by the “convergence bias”
phenomenon (discussed in Section 4) rather than by the dominant trader exerting market power.
It is therefore interesting to note that Muller et al., which use a design that controls for
convergence bias, find strong evidence of price discrimination in a situation where traders only
know their own costs/values.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The experiment reported here investigates a case of intergovernmental carbon emissions
trading towards the end (say, the last six months) of a five-year-long compliance period with one
country (the US) assumed to account for about 90% of the net-trade volume as a buyer. Trade is
governed by double auction rules. Since a seller country in an equally dominant position would
face similar incentives to exert market power as the buyer country studied here, the outcome of
the experiment is taken to be valid also for the case of a dominant seller. The tested hypotheses
were that if the end of the five year long compliance period is characterized by essentially
complete information regarding the underlying net demand, (i) the presence of a large trader is
not likely to create inefficiencies, and (ii) a large trader is not likely to be able to substantially
influence prices to its advantage, during the end-period trading.
The main finding of the experiment is that trade is indeed highly efficient. In six of the eight
trading periods of the experiment more than 95% of the potential (maximum) trade gains
materialized. In other words, we do not observe that the dominant buyer country exerts market
power by withholding demand from the market as predicted by standard economic theory.
                                                 
24
 Presuming otherwise seems unreasonable since the period-1 outcome then would imply that subjects consciously
gave away money to the dominant buyer.
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Since the experiment presented here was designed to parallel important conditions of real
intergovernmental emissions trading, the outcome casts doubts over the validity of assessments
of market power effects in international carbon emissions trading that indicate substantial
efficiency losses.
In four of the eight trading periods, trade generated rather flat price paths, quite near the
competitive (efficient) price level. Three of these periods represented a second trading period of
the experiment. In the other four periods, prices converged towards the efficient level from
below giving the dominant trader substantially larger trade gains than had the market been
perfectly competitive. The fact that three of these four cases represent the first trading period of
the experiment indicates that even if the subjects representing the dominant buyer were able to
substantially manipulate the market to their advantage in the first period, they were not able to do
so to the same extent in the second period.
The difference between the outcomes in the first trading period and the second trading period
may be because subjects, despite the extensive efforts made to train and inform them in ways
compatible with the field, needed to trade at least once under conditions similar to those used in
the test in order to acquire the competence of experienced traders and/or to fully trust the
information given to them. If so, only the outcome in the second period would reflect trade
between experienced traders equipped with accurate expectations regarding the efficient price
level, as real-world trading would have it. Given the small number of observations produced
here, further tests is needed to establish whether well-trained traders would tend to generate
predominantly flat price paths close to the competitive level.
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APPENDIX
Instructions
 
The subjects received written information on two occasions. Two days before the experiment,
they were given information common to all subjects. At the beginning of the experiment, each
subject received private information about which country he/she was assigned to, the updated
abatement cost schedule of that country, and his/her payoff factor. This final section reproduces
the information common to the subjects and, for illustration, the private information given to the
subject representing country #0. Text in bold within parenthesis serves as explanations to the
reader of this paper.
COMMON INFORMATION (TRANSLATED FROM SWEDISH)
A1. Background
You will participate in an experiment that seeks to shed some light on the possibilities to, by
the means of so-called emission trading, reduce the costs of a climate treaty with the objective of
preventing significant changes in the global climate.
Background: The global community faces the following threat. The growing
concentration of so-called greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere runs the risk of
leading to an increase in the average global temperature.25 Such a climate change, if large,
may give rise to rather drastic consequences, such as changes in the wind and sea
currents, reduced food production, higher sea level, and a desertification. The conditions
for localization of settlements, farming and industries would thereby be affected,
resulting in possibly large population movements. The international community has taken
this threat seriously. At the UN’s conference on environment and development in 1992 in
Rio de Janeiro, the so-called Climate Convention was adopted. The objective of the
Climate Convention is to stabilize the concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere at such a
level and within such a time frame that the above-mentioned changes will not be drastic
and that the ecological systems can adjust more slowly.
The single most important GHG is carbon dioxide (CO2). CO2 is emitted to the
atmosphere mainly through combustion of fossil fuels. There exists no economically
feasible technique to separate CO2 from other emissions of fossil fuel combustion. Thus,
in order to prevent climate changes the use of fossil fuels has to be reduced. A specific
feature of GHGs is that their effect on the global climate does not depend, to any
significant extent, on where the emission source is located.
Over 160 countries have signed the Climate Convention. In December last year (1997), these
countries gathered in Kyoto, Japan, to negotiate over country specific emission targets for CO2
for the period after the year 2000. The Kyoto-meeting resulted in a proposal to a climate treaty
comprising a set of quantitative emission targets for the industrialized countries. If a sufficiently
large number of countries ratify the proposal, the treaty will come into force. In what follows it is
assumed that this is the case and that the Kyoto-protocol has entered into force. The emission
quotas (targets) for the largest OECD-countries are presented in Table A1 below.
                                                 
25
 GHG are gases that restrict the radiation of heat from the earth.
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The costs of reducing the CO2 emissions differ between countries. A given aggregated
emission target for a group of countries is attained at lowest possible cost when each country has
reduced its emissions by the amount that yields equality in marginal abatement costs for all
countries. Lower emissions of CO2 presupposes a limitation of the use of fossil fuels, which
dominates the majority of the industrialized countries energy system, whereby abatements of
CO2 are associated with large costs for these economies. Cost-effectiveness, i.e., to minimize
these costs, is therefore of great importance for international climate change policy.
The ambition of the Kyoto-meeting was to find an allocation of national emission quotas that
as many countries as possible could accept. In order to facilitate a cost-effective allocation of the
aggregated emission reduction the, Kyoto Protocol allows countries committed to binding
emission targets to engage in emission trading. Countries with high marginal abatement costs can
on such a market pay countries with lower costs to reduce their emissions by more than what
their national emission quotas imply so as to make all involved countries gain from this trade.
Trade with emission quotas does not differ in any important aspect from trade with other goods
and services. On a competitive market an equilibrium price would be established so that the
marginal abatement costs in different countries are equalized, i.e., the cost-effective allocation of
emission reductions is attained.
The objective of this experiment is to study the performance of trade with CO2 emission quota
units when trade is conducted on a stock-exchange kind of market and when the countries
engaged in trading are of different sizes.
A.2 The Experiment
The experiment intends to mimic the following assumed situation. A group of 12 countries
committed to the national emission targets allotted to them by the Kyoto-meeting (see Table A1)
has decided to use the possibility that the Kyoto Protocol gives to emission trading and to
establish an organized market for emission quota units. With this possibility to trade each
country has to choose between:
(a) reducing its national emissions by more than necessary and sell the surplus of emission
quota units to some other country(-ies),
(b) increase its own emission quota (target) buy paying some other country(-ies) to reduce
their emissions, or
(c) attaining its emission target only by reducing its own emissions.
Trade with emission quota units will be governed by so-called double-auction rules. (The set
of rules that governs the majority of the large stock exchanges and markets for primary goods
throughout the world.) In the experiment, the market will be electronic, something that has been
more and more common among the large stock markets. Each country is connected to the market
through a computer terminal. When the market is open a country that wants to buy can via its
computer send a buy order (unit price and number of units) to a central computer. A country that
wants to sell can in the same manner send a sell order (unit price and number of units). The buy
order with the highest price and the sell order with the lowest price are made public as the
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standing bids. This information is shown on each country’s computer monitor. The standing buy
order (sell order) is replaced when the central computer receives a higher (lower) buy order (sell
order). This rule tends to give adjustments of declining sell orders and ascending buy orders until
some agent accepts to trade to the standing sell/buy price. When a country accepts the standing
buy (sell) order (or part thereof), this order is removed (or reduced by the accepted volume). All
acceptances of standing sell/buy orders lead to binding transactions. This double-auction market
does not use any order book/queue. The implication of this is that when the volume of a standing
bid/ask has been accepted the next buy/sell order the central computer receives will be the
standing bid. It is possible for a lower (higher) buy (sell) order to become the standing bid. The
price levels at which emission quota units are traded can therefore increase and decline during
the trading period.
On this market it is assumed that the trade unit is 1 Mton. That is, quantities offered/asked can
be amounts such as 7 Mton, 3 Mton and 1 Mton. Prices can only be stated in terms of whole
MSEK/Mton.
Countries that will engage in real emission trading have strong incentives to gather
information about each other’s expected emission levels. Table A1 presents the countries’
expected CO2 emission levels in year 2010 and their emission targets that year. The emission
reduction each country is responsible for amounts to the difference between the expected
emission level and the emission quota (target).
 
 Table A1. Emission levels and emission reductions in year 2010, millions ton CO2
          Emissions     Emissions target Emissions reduction
 2010 2010 2010
 
 Country #0 112 100 12
 Country #1 970 750 220
 Country #2 90 90 0
 Country #3 250 250 0
 Country #4 395 370 25
 Country #5 460 380 80
 Country #6 170 140 30
 Country #7 63 57 6
 Country #8 80 65 15
 Country #9 610 530 80
 Country #10 6,500 4,600 1,900
 Country #11 1,400 1,000 400
 
 Total 11,100 8,332 2,768
 
The countries would also have strong incentives to collect information about each other’s
costs of reducing emissions of CO2. It is unlikely that countries would be able to successfully
disguise from other countries large abatement opportunities and the cost of these. Therefore, it is
assumed that the countries have been so successful in gathering information about each other’s
costs measures that they have common expectations about these cost schedules.
With the concept of marginal abatement cost (MAC) is here meant the cost of reducing the
emissions of CO2 by one unit. MAC is the sacrifice (the value of the reduction in consumption
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and production) a country needs to do in order to reduce its emissions of CO2. In Appendix 1 the
countries’ MACs are presented in diagrams. Figure A1 below illustrates such a diagram for an
assumed country.
Figure A1 illustrates country Xempel’s net-demand curve for CO2 emissions, equal to the
country’s marginal valuation (MV) of emissions. Without any climate treaty the country would
increase its emissions until its valuation of further emissions equals zero, i.e., the country’s
emission level would be where the MV-curve intersects the x-axis. This level is the forecasted
emissions level and is labeled business-as-usual (BAU) level. Emission levels below the BAU
level imply that incomes are sacrificed, i.e., costs for the country. The costs of reducing
emissions from the BAU level is indicated by the MV-curve read from right to the left. The
curve thus, illustrates the country’s marginal costs of reducing CO2 emissions.
The vertical line in the diagram marked with target level (the target line) states the emissions
level the country is committed to not to exceed. In case a country chooses to accomplish its
emission target unilaterally, i.e., only by domestic emission reductions, the country’s MAC
equals the level at which the MV-curve intersects the target line. A country’s total cost of
attaining its emission target unilaterally is given by the area under the MV-curve between the
target level and the BAU-level (the shaded area).
In order to avoid talking about prices that can be perceived as related to the real experimental
situation, we use in this and subsequent examples a hypothetical monetary unit, MFrang.
[image intentionally omitted]
Figure A1. Country Xmple’s Marginal valuation (marginal cost) of emissions, MFrang/Mton CO2.
(For an illustration of this type of diagram the reader is referred to Figure 1 in the main text.)
The point of departure for interpreting this type of diagram is that the country in absence of
trade will be at the point where the MV-curve intersects the target line. A country can make trade
gains by purchasing emission quota units, i.e., increasing its emission quota, to prices lower than
the country’s valuation of additional emissions (marginal cost of reducing its emissions).
Similarly, a country makes trade gains also by selling emission quota units, i.e., reducing its
emissions by more than required by the emission target, to prices that are higher than the
country’s marginal abatement cost. Figure A1 shows that country Xmpel’s MV-curve and target
level give an underlying demand/supply schedule such that the country can make trade gains by
selling quota units (go to the left from the target line) at prices above 300 MFrang/Mton and/or
purchasing emission quota units (go to the right from the target level) at prices lower than 300
MFrang/Mton. Hence, whether country Xmpel will act as a seller or a buyer of emission quota
units depends on the price levels that are established on the market. It is possible that the price
path is such that country Xmpel finds it profitable to first act as a buyer and then as a seller, or
vice versa.
As shown in Appendix 1, the expected MAC differs among the countries. These differences
reflect i.a. differences in endowments of energy, geographical and economical conditions. If
each country chooses to accomplish its emission target unilaterally, the MACs would vary
between 0 MSEK/Mton (country #2 and country #3) and 2,400 MSEK/Mton (country #8).
Hence, the aggregated emission target can be attained at lower costs if the countries engage in
emission quota trade.
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Maximum potential trade gains
Given information about the countries’ expected MV-curves and emission targets (Table A1)
the countries’ expected underlying demand/supply schedules for emission quotas could be
calculated. (Individual countries’ as well as the aggregate underlying demand/supply conditions
are presented in Appendix 1) Equipped with this information, it is possible to calculate the
(expected) perfectly competitive outcome. This gives information about the expected efficient
price (p*), the countries’ net demand and supply at this price level and an idea of how trade gains
are distributed among countries in the case price levels on the market would not deviate much
from the expected efficient level. Under perfect competition the market price is such that the
countries’ MAC would be equalized. The expected efficient price would amount to 1,500
MSEK/Mton and the trade among the 12 countries to 395 Mton. This trade and the associated
surplus would be distributed as shown by Table A2.
Table A2.  Trade under perfect competition, Mton CO2 and SEK billion, respectively
p* = MSEK 1,500/Mton
Unilateral                   Emission reduction ex post trade:                            
Emissions Cost Mton Cost Net gains: % of unilateral SEK
reduction cost per capita
#0 12 2.00 36 22.5 15.5 775 1,532
#1 220 66.0 285 131 32.2 49 396
#2 0 0 22 11.5 21.5 2,062
#3 0 0 59 33.3 55.2 1,410
#4 25 13.8 34 25.4 1.80 13 32
#5 80 32.0 110 66.5 10.5 33 184
#6 30 11.2 45 26.2 7.50 67 488
#7 6 0.90 17 9.50 15.6 878 1,574
#8 15 17.2 10 7.50 3.00 13 342
#9 80 20.0 240 180 80.0 400 1,370
#10 1,900 1,503 1 550 878 100 7 385
#11 400 275 360 207 8.00 3 64
Σ 2,768 1 941 2 768 1,598 343 18 467
 
The difference between column 2 and 4 states the countries’ expected net trade under perfect
competition. A negative value indicates that the country is a net seller and a positive value that
the country is a net buyer. In the case illustrated in Table A2 three countries appear as net buyers
(countries #8, #10 and #11) and nine countries as net sellers. Note that the buyer side is strongly
concentrated with a single agent (country #10) answering for almost 90% of the demand at the
efficient price level.
As indicated earlier, countries have strong incentives gather information about each other’s
underlying demand/supply conditions prior to the emission quota trade, whereby the remaining
uncertainty would be quite small. Before trade begins on Wednesday (9/12) you will receive
updated information about the underlying demand/supply schedule (the true MV-curve) for the
country you will represent.
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The trading situation/traders’ information
It is not obvious that all, if any, trade will be conducted at p* so that the outcome would be as
Table A2 indicates. On an exchange as this one, different transactions can be concluded at
different prices. Moreover, no agent can be taken as a price taker, no matter how small it is.
Each\ country decides what price and quantity to bid (and at which point in time to send it) and
at which price levels he/she is willingly to accept to buy/sell emission quota units. Thus, realized
prices are determined by negotiations. At this market all transactions are binding, i.e., they
cannot be annulled. This means that additional trade will not affect revenues and expenditures of
agreements already concluded. The implication of this is that each agent has incentives to
buy/sell additional quota units as long as the standing sell/buy price (the price at which someone
is willingly to sell/buy quota units) is lower/higher than the agent’s MAC. This implies that this
type of market tends to generate buy/sell prices at the end of the market day that lie close to p*.
It has been shown that this is true also for the cases where initial buy/sell prices deviate
significantly from the efficient level.
In a real trading situation large values will be at stake. The countries can therefore be
expected to engage experienced and competent traders to represent them at the market for
emission quota units. As accounted for above, traders on this market can be taken to being well
informed about other countries’ expected underlying demand/supply conditions and thereby
having a pretty good perception about p*. Experienced traders are familiar with the functioning
of this type of markets and, in particular, that it tends to generate end (marginal) prices close to
the efficient level. Such traders are also aware of the opportunity for profitable speculative trade
that arises if the price would deviate substantially from p*.
By profitable speculative trade is meant the following. If the standing buy price during a
period would be significantly higher than p* and later on converge to that level, it would be
possible to make trade gains by selling emission quota units during the “high-price” period and
buy them back later on when the price has declined. Correspondingly, it would be possible to
make profitable speculative trade if the standing sell prices during a period were lower than p*.
Experienced traders monitor the market carefully in order to trade at best possible prices and,
when the opportunity arises, take advantage of price variations.
Hence, the scope of profitable speculative trade implies that a trader may have incentives to
buy/sell larger volumes than his/her country’s underlying demand/supply schedule actually
indicates. A trader that represent a country with a large underlying net demand of quota units (at
prices around p*) and who is convinced that prices at the end of the trading period will be close
to p* might act as follows. At sell prices above p* he/she will withhold demand and may even
try to sell quota units if the price difference is sufficiently large, in order to buy emission quota
units at lower prices later on. At sell prices below p* the trader will buy large volumes, even
more than the underlying demand/supply schedule actually permits, with the prospects of selling
these units at higher prices later on.
Correspondingly, a trader representing a country with a large underlying supply (at the
efficient price level) might act as follows: At buy prices below p* the agent will withhold supply
and it might even buy quota units in order to sell these units at a higher price later on. At buy
prices that exceed the efficient level by much, the trader might try to sell large volumes, with the
ambition to buy them back later on when the prices are lower.
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To sum up: On this kind of exchange, the price of emission quota units can vary during the
trading period. However, prices at the end of the trading period tend to lie close to the efficient
price level. Real traders can be taken to observe the market carefully in order to trade at best
possible prices and, if the opportunity arises, try to make speculation profits. So, current demand
(supply) may deviate from the sum of all countries’ underlying demand/supply schedules. With
experienced and well-informed traders it is possible that the demand for quota units, when sell
prices are below the efficient level, may well exceed the underlying demand of the market. At
instances when buy prices are above the expected price, it is, correspondingly, possible that a
supply far greater than the underlying supply of the market is materialized.
Please observe! Even if, as has been emphasized here, all traders/countries have strong
incentives to collect information about other countries’ MV-curves, it has to be stressed that no
one with 100% certainty can know whether the available information is correct or if this
information actually will guide the trade. Moreover, it is also possible, of course, that
information about the conditions in other countries contains certain approximations. Political
aspects of potential abatement measures in a country may lead to other decisions about such
measures than those reflected by the calculated MV-curves. Even if these uncertainties, due to
the incentives for information gathering, can be expected to be very small, it is possible that they
affect the basis for the trade of marginal units, i.e., when trade gains for involved parties
according to the given information are small. So, there will be a remaining uncertainty about the
efficient price level. This uncertainty is reflected on the market that you will trade on in the way
that the information about the MV-curves of the countries that is presented in Appendix 1 may
deviate somewhat from the true MV-curves. This means that each trader will, just before the
market opens for trade, receive an updated version of the MV-curve of the country he/she will
represent.
A3. Your Assignment
On Wednesday your will represent one of the above presented countries (country #0 - 11) on
the market for emission quota units. Your assignment is to minimize your country’s costs of
achieving the emission target it is committed to through the Kyoto Protocol.
The point of departure is that the country has calculated the relevant costs for unilaterally
attaining its emission target and has given to its trader, you, a trading budget that enables you to
act on the market for emission quota units. If you accomplish the country’s emission reduction at
a lower cost than the one of attaining the target unilaterally by purchasing (selling) emission
quota units at prices below (above) your country’s MAC, i.e., making trade gains, you will be
paid a certain fraction of this trade gain. On Wednesday you will receive information about the
size of this fraction. At that time you will also be given private information about which country
(of the countries #0 - 11) you will represent and that country’s true underlying demand/supply
schedule. Your expected payment amounts to 400 - 500 SEK.
Below is presented, for the one that wishes to confirm that he/she has understood the text
above, a stylized example of how country Xmpel can act on the emission quota market. As has
been mentioned earlier, we use in our examples a hypothetical monetary unit, MFrang, in order
to avoid talking about prices that can be perceived as related to the real experiment situation.
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Example
Assume that you represent country Xmpel, which is committed to an emission reduction of 8
Mton and has MAC according to Figure A1. The costs of the country attaining its emission
target unilaterally amounts to 1,2000 MFrang. (The shaded area.) A possible sequence of
happenings is the following. At the beginning of the trading period you announce a sell order,
which becomes the standing sell order: 1 Mton at the price 500 MFrang/Mton. This bid, if
accepted, would give your country a trade gain of:
150 MFrang (= 500 MFrang x 1 Mton – ( )400 300
2
− MFrang
 x 1 Mton – 300 MFrang x 1 Mton,
where the first term states revenues and the other two the area beneath the MC-curve in the
interval 16 to 17 Mton). Assume, however, that this bid was not accepted. We assume that you,
after a relative short period find out that there exist countries willingly to sell quota units at
prices around 200 MFrang/Mton, a price level at which you are prepared to buy 2 Mton. You
send a bid with the content that you accept to buy 2 Mton at the price 200 MFrang per Mton,
which is registered before any other buy bids/acceptances. Therefore, a transaction with that
content is conducted. This trade gives your country a trade gain of:
100 MFrang (= 200 MFrang x 2 Mton + ( )300 200
2
− MFrang
 x 2 Mton – 200 MFrang x 2 Mton,
where the two first terms states the abatement costs country Xmpel avoids by conducting this
trade and the third terms states the import expenditures.). Thereafter you find that the standing
asks and bids lay around 200 MFrang, price levels which do not allow you to make any larger
trade gains. After a while the market has closed. Your net trade is a purchase of 2 Mton for
country Xmpels account, i.e., country Xmpel is allowed to emit 19 Mton instead of 17 Mton.
According to this example, Country Xmpel’s trade gains (= avoided abatement cost – net
expenditures) are 100 MFrang.
Thus, the result of this trade is that country Xmpel attains the emission reduction it is
committed to at a lower cost than had the country attained its emission target unilaterally (i.e., if
it would have conducted the whole emission reduction solely by domestic actions). As
mentioned above, your payment is proportional to the trade gain of the country you represent.
Hence, the payment you receive after the experiment depends on how successful you are at the
market for emission quota units.
It is not necessarily for you to continuously calculate your country’s accumulated trade gains
to be able to act successfully on the market. It suffices to be able to determine relatively fast
whether or not your country will gain from conducting different transactions. The important
thing is to be able to calculate how your country’s abatement costs change due to the transaction.
Therefore, we ask you to practice on how to calculate changes in the abatement costs.
A way to train on acting on this kind of market is that you by yourself play the role of a
couple of typical countries and contemplate how you would act given different price paths.
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A4. Other Things
On Wednesday you will, prior to the experiment, be given the opportunity to practice on the
type of electronic market that the emission quota trade will be based on. Before trade begins you
will receive private information about which of the countries #0 -#11 you will represent, that
country’s true MV-curve as well as the fraction of the trade gains you are allowed to keep. At
that time a short presentation of instructions will be held and any questions will be answered.
APPENDIX 1
(Appendix included in common instructions.)
(The diagrams show the expected MAC-curves of the twelve countries as well as
expected aggregate net demand. The x-axis measures emission levels (Mton CO2) and the y-
axis values (MSEK/Mton). In the information given to subjects, vertical lines indicated
countries’ target levels. For these levels, see Table A1 above.)
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*
PRIVATE INFORMATION
(Example of the information given to the subjects at the beginning of the experiment.)
You have been appointed to negotiate for country #0. Your assignment is to minimize your
country’s cost for reaching the emission target the country by signing the Kyoto Protocol has
committed itself to: That by the year 2010 not emit more than 100 Mton CO2 (=your country’s
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initial inventory). The country’s updated MV-curve (see the attached figure in which the largest
changes are marked) indicates the BAU emission level to 112 Mton CO2. Country #0 is thus
committed to an emission reduction of the amount of 12 Mton CO2.
The other countries’ emission targets, expected BAU emission levels as well as the emission
reductions they are expected to be committed to are presented in the common information you
have received (Table A1). There you also find information about the other countries’ expected
marginal abatement cost schedules.
The cost of your country to unilaterally attain its emission target amounts to 2,200 MSEK (the
area beneath your country’s actual MV-curve—also it’s MC-curve—in the interval the target
level-the BAU level). By acting on the market for emission quota units it may be possible for
your country to make trade gains.
You have at your disposal an amount of 19,000 MSEK( = your country’s initial cash on
hand). You can use this amount to buy emission quota units from other countries. Your are not
allowed to buy emission quota units on credit. Hence, your expenditures cannot exceed your cash
on hand. If you sell emission quota units your cash on hand increases with the sales revenues.
Your cash on hand will automatically be updated when you transact at the market.
You are not allowed to sell more emission quota units than the country has at its disposal.
Hence, your net sales of emission quota units cannot, at any time, be larger than 100 Mton (=
your country’s initial inventory). Moreover, your country has only calculated its marginal
abatement costs over the interval 70-112 Mton CO2. This means that your country does not
allow your net sale at the end of the trading period to imply an ex post trade emission quota that
lies outside this interval. However, nothing stops you from leaving this interval temporarily
during the trading period.
Your payment consists of a fixed fee (200 SEK which you will receive after the experiment)
and an incentive payment. The incentive payment is calculated as follows: Prior to any trade it
amounts to 25 SEK. For each 1,000 MSEK in trade gains you negotiate to your country the
incentive payment increases with 6 SEK. (In case you would make losses it will be reduced by 6
SEK per 1,000 MSEK losses. The incentive payment can, however, never be lower than 0 SEK.)
Your country’s trade gains are calculated as described earlier.
*
INFORMATION GIVEN FOR THE SECOND PERIOD
(Example of the information given to the subjects at the beginning of the second trading period.)
1.  Your assignment
Also in this trading period you represent country #0. As before, your assignment is to try to
minimize your country’s net cost of reaching the emission target it is committed to through the
climate treaty: The emission target equals 100 Mton CO2 (= your country’s initial inventory).
Your country’s updated MV-curve indicates as the BAU emission level 110 Mton CO2, see
Appendix 2.1. Your country is thereby committed to an emission reduction of 10 Mton CO2.
The cost for your country of attaining this emission target unilaterally amounts to 1,562.5
MSEK.
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You have at your disposal an amount of 19,000 MSEK (=your country’s initial cash on hand).
For every 1,000 MSEK in trade gains you negotiate for your country you earn 8 SEK. In all
other aspects the rules are as in the first period.
As you can see, the trading situation differ somewhat from the previous period in that the
countries’ BAU emission levels, emission targets and expected underlying demand/supply
schedules are different. You can interpret this trading situation in the following way. Countries
that year 2010 were committed to binding emission targets are taken to be committed also for
subsequent periods. BAU and underlying demand/supply schedules for a later year, say 2015, are
likely to differ from the conditions that prevailed the year 2010. It is also possible that the
emission quotas for the year 2015 would be different than those for the year 2010. The countries
would in such a sequential period utilize any lessons from earlier trading periods.
Below is given information about your country’s and other countries’ emission targets and
forecasted emission levels (Table A1), expected underlying demand/supply conditions
(Appendix 2.1) as well as the calculated perfectly competitive outcome (Table A2).
2. Common information
Table 1 Emission levels and emission reductions in the year 2010, millions ton CO2 (This
Table is similar to Table A1 above)
In case each country chooses to attain its emission target unilaterally, the expected MACs
would vary between 0 MSEK/Mton (country #2 and country #3) and 2,400 MSEK/Mton
(country #8).
The expected efficient price equals 1,200 MSEK/Mton and the net trade among these
countries amounts to 387 Mton CO2. This trade and the associated surplus would be distributed
as is presented in Table 2.
Table 2 Trade under perfect competition, Mton CO2 and MSEK, respectively (Similar to
Table A2 above)
The difference between column 2 and 4 states the countries’ net trade. A negative value
indicates that the country is a net seller of emission quota units and a positive value that the
country is a net buyer. In the case of perfect competition as illustrated in Table 2, three countries
act as net buyers (countries #8, 10 and 11) and nine countries act as net sellers. Note that the
buyer side is highly concentrated with a single buyer (country #10) accounting for about 90% of
the demand at the expected efficient price.
Appendix 2.1: Expected MV-curves of all countries and the expected aggregated net demand.
(Not shown here. See Appendix 1 to common instructions for the same type of diagrams.)
Appendix 2.2: Country #0’s true MV-curve turned out to be the same as the expected MV-
curve presented in Appendix 2.1.
(The Private information given to subjects in the second round corresponds to the private
information they received in the first round, see above.)
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